Parliamentary sovereignty

parliamentary reignAlthough in theory fan tan is sovereign, the bad reality is that British fundamental arrangements ensure that accepted fountain lies with the Executive.Part A Many countries such as the United States be collapse a indite constitution more(prenominal)over Britain does not, however it essential have mostthing which is at the heart of its constitutional arrangements1 and this remove is fulfilled by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.The traditional and most a lot applied definition of parliamentary sovereignty is that of unsafe, who stated, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty means the right to make or unmake any justness whatever and come along, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or curing aside the rule of fantan2. From this definition, three fundamental principles fucking be derived the kickoff is that Parliament can make or unmake any law. An compositors case of this princi ple in practice The Septennial play 1715 was passed to extend the life of Parliament from three to s redden years unwrap of fear of the effects of an election. His Majestys contract of Abdication propel 1936 demonstrates Parliaments great(p) political sympathies agency to alter the line of succession to the good deal and the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 demonstrate Parliament legislating over its own procedures.The contend Damage Act 1965 overruled a home of headmasters decision in Burmah embrocate Company v Lord Advocate 19653 and is a demonstration of Parliaments ability to make or unmake any law as it was qualified to legislate with retrospective effect.The second principle of Diceys theory is that Parliament cannot be bound by its predecessors or contain its successors. This affirms Thomas Paines theory that, each(prenominal)(prenominal) age and generation mustinessiness be free to act for itself, in all cases as the ages and generations which preceded it4. V auxhall Estates Ltd v Liverpool Corporation 19325 concerned conflict among The Housing Act 1925 and the Acquisition of Land Act 1919 where it was held that the provisions of the after act would apply this is cognize as implied repeal and demonstrates Parliaments inability to bind its successors. Ellen Streets Estates Ltd. v Minister for Health 19346 besides held that the later Act must apply and it was stated that the intention of Parliament to repeal the legislation must be devoted effect just because it is the get out of the general assembly7. The third sancti aned principle of Diceys theory is that no-one can head Parliaments laws, as Blackstone stated, true it is, that what the Parliament doth, no authority on earth can undo8. In Edinburgh Dalkeith railway system Co v Wauchope 18429, Wauchope sought to challenge an Act of Parliament on the grounds that he was not induen notice of its introduction as a bill into Parliament. His challenge was rejected on the al-Qaeda t hat the courts ar precluded from investigating whether the proper internal procedures have in fact been complied with10, this is known as the enrolled act rule, affirmed in Pickin v British Railways come along 197411. The courts cannot question the validity of an Act of Parliament or decl atomic number 18 it reduce illustrating the role of the judiciary in upholding the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.Exceptionally in R (Jackson) v Attorney General 200512 the validity of the Hunting Act 2004 and use of the Parliament Act 1949 were challenged. It was affirmed that regardless of the way an Act has been passed, even if using the Parliament Acts, the courts cannot challenge the validity of primeval legislation. and Jackson did raise issues of sovereignty in practice, Lord entrust stated, the side of meat principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliamentis being qualified13. parliamentary sovereignty is app atomic number 18ntly sustained, accompanimently by t he judiciary and is justified in that the principal(prenominal) legislative House, the ballpark, is democrati forebodey elected. Yet the acknowledgement by Lord Hope in Jackson recognises that the concept is increasingly subject to limitations.Lord Steyn in Jackson besides recognised the dominance of the parking area by the administrator- the administration, the index fingerfulness of a government with a large(p) majority in the House of Commons is redoub hold over14, and warned that use of the Parliament Acts creates a danger of exorbitant avowal of government office15. This assertion of power that Lord Steyn warns of should theory-basedly be anticipateed by the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. The doctrine of the separation of powers is largely associated with might Montesquieu who establish his famous exposition of the doctrine on his understanding of the British constitution16. He identified three institutions of the state the legislature that makes the laws, the executive director director director director director that formulates and forges insurance policy and the judiciary that adjudicates upon and imposes sanctions for breaking the law. Montesquieu argued that the result of these three powers concentrated in the equivalent man or the same body17 would pose a flagellum to separate liberty and that to prevent excessive concentration of macrocosm power the functions of each(prenominal) should be allocated clearly. stock-still Jennings identified that Montesquieu did not mean that the legislature and executive should have no influence over the other, scarcethat neither should exercise the power of the other18. in that location should be a system of checks and balances in signal to void concentration of power.The United States is an sample of strong separation as the written constitution embeds the doctrine the structure and power of the three institutions is laid out within Articles 1-3. Checks a nd balances atomic number 18 in place to ensure separation of power, for example the Presidents proposed legislative programme is checked by congress and the Supreme Court. thither is however, in practice, fusion between the legislature and executive in the British constitution for example the constitutional chemical formula that segments of the executive come from one of the Houses of Parliament, the executive, far from being separated from the legislature, is drawn from within its ranks19. The set Minister, is also by convention a member of the House of Commons the legislature. In contrast, in the United States the president is separately elected and may be of a different political fellowship than the one with a majority in either or both Houses of Congress.Under the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 there is imposed a statutory limit of 95 government ministers that may come from the House of Commons and prohibition of accepted groups from becoming members such as c ivil servants and judicial office holders. This to approximately extent preserves separation however through its majority in the House of Commons the executive it is still likely to have the ability to dominate proceedings. By convention, the political party that wins the most seats at a general election forms a government the executive and a first past the post electoral system ensures that it will have a large majority of seats in the House of Commons. Dicey recognised this as a worrying shift in power stating that the majority party in the House can arrogate to itself that legislative omnipotence which of right belongs to the nation20. Essentially there is a concern that the executive can control the legislative command of Parliament and ensure that its legislative proposals atomic number 18 enacted. There is also a fusion of function as the executive is involved in law making through delegated legislation. A large summation is do by Ministers and departments of the executi ve concerning important matters with justification in its efficiency compared with the passing of an Act of Parliament. It can also be made by those with specialist knowledge whilst mononuclear phagocyte system may not have the relevant expertise. However it conflicts with the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty as the executive is the supreme law making body in terms of the amount of legislation produced. Subsequently power lies with the executive at the expense of the legislature, both(prenominal) have depicted this state of affairs as an abdication by Parliament from its principle constitutional role in favour of the executive21. claim powers are an example of fusion as they leave considerable power in the hands of the executive and allow Ministers to legislate without the consent of Parliament. However to some extent this is limited by judicial review as in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union 199522, where it was held that it was unlawfu l for the Home Secretary to introduce changes to a scheme which were incompatible with an Act of Parliament.The unwritten British constitution is based largely on conventions and this is an important contributor to fusion between the legislature and executive. Although in theory Parliament is sovereign, in practice this legislative supremacy of Parliament is in force(p)ly inherited by the executive giving it true power.The constitutional theorist Walter Bagehot argues that far from being a problem, this fused kinship had clear merits, the efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers.23 Lord Hailsham used the term elective dictatorship24, to criticise the way in which the executive may control the legislature. Part B In light(a) of this, it is to be critically evaluated to what extent this fusion is hard whether the checks and balances as confident(p) by the doctrine of the separation of powers are effective enough to prevent abuse of power by the executive in particular Parliamentary scrutiny.There is a concern that the Government in general is to a fault dominant over parliamentary proceedings25 such as the Parliamentary timetable and legislative branch. The majority of Bills considered by Parliament will be introduced by the executive and derive from its policy commitments. With its strong majority in Parliament the executive is afterward able to secure its policies into law and this is predominately through control of its members quite a than active engagement with the issues26. Party members are told by government whips to voting in accordance with the party line and are unlikely to disport from this requirement as supporting the party is beneficial they are more likely to be promoted to a position within the executive. Almost all bills are approved by each House even if they are amended and by convention the Queen cannot refuse the royal as sent.Delegated legislation such as statutory instruments and orders in council are also a significant example of the legislative power of the executive in particular Henry VIII clauses of the parent act allowing statutory instruments to change the primary legislation itself. It is argued that these clauses go right to the heart of the key constitutional question of the limits of executive power27. The Legislative Regulatory elucidate Bill (LRRB) when introduced into Parliament contained many an(prenominal) of these clauses which would have enabled Ministers to make delegated legislation amending, repealing or replacing primary or secondary legislation. It was termed the abolition of Parliament bill because of the power it would give to Ministers it also proposed limitations on Parliamentary scrutiny of these actions by Ministers.Parliamentary scrutiny of the executive is of fundamental importance in ensuring that the government acts under the law and in accordance with the princip les of constitutionalism and democracy28. John Lockes theory of the consent of the governed29 is such that a governments legitimacy to use state power is exclusively justified and legal when derived from the people. thusly the executive should be news reportable to Parliament, as a representative of the electorate. The theoretical underpinning of this accounting systemability is the convention of ministerial responsibility. Collective responsibility is such that Ministers must creationly approve the Cabinets decisions or resign this serves to strengthen the executive further by always showing a united front but does not enhance transparency. Individually Ministers must bear responsibility for the actions of their departments. There are various scrutiny mechanisms used to hold the executive and its Ministers to account for their actions however their effectiveness is often doubtful.ministerial interview cadence enables Members of Parliament to question government Ministers in the House of Commons. This method of obtaining information and scrutinising the actions of the executive is not a spontaneous affair30 as there is notice given of the questions to be asked. However there is strength in that the answers given are recorded and subsequently become a part of public records. The Ministerial Code outlines that ministers give accurate and truthful information to Parliament31 and that ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament and the public32 providing firm regulation on the answers to be given. Question Time is televised and it is arguable that this is successful at providing public insight of the executive being held to account. However it is problematic as the televised broker leads to a theatrical and superficial occasion. Parliament may face obstacle in questioning the executive as there are various restrictions on the types of questions that can be asked Ministers are only questioned on matters instanter within their responsibility, with some subjects excluded completely such as the personal powers of the milkweed butterfly and defence and national security33. Ministers can also refuse to answer questions on grounds including cost of obtaining the information or whether the question is in the public gratify. They can also refuse to answer certain questions under the restrictions in the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Furthermore, if a Minister refuses to answer a question they cannot be pressed to answer it. These limitations on questioning are so problematic and prevent proper scrutiny the obtaining of information, by MPs on behalf of their constituents, lies at the heart of the scrutiny process ill-informed debate will not be effective34. As questions are not limited to the foe party it is arguable that as sycophantic questions are frequently asked35 Question Time is used by the executive to promote its own views and party achievements. This does however have the benefit of raising party morale and asse rtion in seeing the party leaders perform well in Parliament. Although this then becomes more about the political relationship rather than scrutiny, with the parties severe to expose weaknesses in each other. Written questions are arguably a more effective mechanism for obtaining information rather than oral questions. The funds for Questions scandal was also problematic as Members were being paid to table certain questions for Ministers and therefore not effectively scrutinising their actions. Its reputation for holding Ministers to account was also somewhat ruined.For Prime Ministers Question Time questions are notified in writing and this first formal, open question is usually to ask the Prime Ministers engagements for the day providing a neutral peg on which to hang a supplementary, and real, question36. The wide range of supplementary questions asked, without notice, means the Prime Minister postulate to be able to demonstrate his competence across a proficient range of gov ernment policy37 and this spontaneity provides stronger scrutiny. However Prime Ministers Question Time is allocated only 30 minutes per week providing a very hornswoggle amount of time for questioning.Various debates on the floor of the House of Commons are also an opportunity for scrutiny. They are often used to conduct the view of an individual Member and the support for this view attracting public interest and media coverage subsequently pressure is placed on the government to reply depending on its support. However debates are limited by the adversary role model in which they are held38 and Ministers are often not to be questioned on their responses which is problematic as it prevents deeper questioning on the issues. A vote on a motion of no confidence is arguably the most effective at holding the executive to account if the government is defeated the convention is that it must resign or seek dissolution of Parliament and call a general election. Parliament therefore does h ave ultimate power in with bill of exchange its confidence however this is not really a threat due to party discipline it is more likely to be of influence on the government. A vote of no confidence is rare and even more rarely successful the last time a government lost such a vote was in 1979 where the Callaghan Government resigned and called a general election.Select charges examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the principal government departments39 and also canvas other matters of public interest or concern. They are composed, by convention, of backbenchers and this theoretically increases their independence, they are also free to decide which matters to investigate without government approval. Select committees also have the power to send for persons, text file and records40 to assist in their work and often provide highly influential reports, however they are perhaps more successful in drawing media and subsequently public attention to issues of importance. The party whips also have great influence, if not total control, over membership41 chairmanship is open to any party and it is therefore possible it will be chaired by an executive party member creating the problem of further dominance within the committee. Committees can also only investigate a small proportion of the activities of the department as they are constrained by time and with each department having its own committee it is more difficult to investigate issues that cut across several departments. They are also only capable of advising on matters and with no powers to impose sanctions, this is problematic as it does not allow active control. Select committees are also subject to several limitations, such as that there is no duty that the government should cooperate with them when the select committee on defence started its question into the Westland Helicopter affair, the government refused to allow witnesses from the Department of Trade and Industry to give evidence. The y justified this in saying that giving evidence would have major implications for the conduct and relations of the government. Civil servants have often been forbidden from visual aspect on the grounds of national security or excessive cost42. This is problematic as the executive is protected from real scrutiny by screen the inner workings of government43.Britains unwritten constitution is problematic as its basis on conventions enables the executive to inherit the legal sovereignty of Parliament and subsequently it is the dominant institution to which the other two institutions react44. Parliamentary scrutiny does not control the executive, it merely reacts when necessary. This is problematic as it is one of the checks and balances in place to prevent the concentration of power that Montesquieu warned would be a threat to liberty. The executive often appears to abuse its power through its dominance of the legislative process to pass legislation for its benefit and even dominate t he mechanisms for its own scrutiny. Lord Hailshams description of an elective dictatorship appears to be the problematic reality.1 Broadbent,G., existence rightfulness Directions, (2009), p.502 Dicey, A.V, An Introduction to the righteousness of the Constitution, (1885), p.383 AC 754 Paine, T., Rights of Man, (1987), p.2045 1 KB 7336 1 KB 5907 Ibid at p.597 per Maugham LJ8 Blackstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69)9 8 Cl Fin 71010 Alder, J., primitive and administrative Law, (2007), p. 20111 AC 76512 UKHL 5613 Ibid at 104 per Lord Hope14 Ibid at 71 per Lord Steyn15 Ibid at 101 per Lord Steyn16 Barendt, E., Separation of powers and constitutional government, (1995) Win Public Law 599 at p.59917 Montesquieu, De lEsprit des Lois, (1794) p. one hundred sixty-five18 Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, (1959) App. 119 Barnett, H., complete and Administrative Law, (2009), p.8320 Weill, R., Dicey was not Diceyan, (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 474 at p.49021 De Smith, S.A., Constitutional and Administrative Law, (1977), p.32122 1995 2 A.C. 51323 Bagehot, W., The English Constitution, (1867) p.1224 Lord Hailsham, Elective Dictatorship (1976)25 Reform of the House of Commons Select Committee, First Report, Rebuilding the House, (November 2009) para. 2326 Wright, T., British Politics A Very Short Introduction, (2003), p.8827 HL Deb Vol. 643 col. 165 14 January 200328 Barnett op. cit., p.38529 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, (1824), p.21530 Barnett op. cit., p.38631 Cabinet Office, The Ministerial Code, (July 2007), p.632 Ibid33 Erskine May, 1997, Ch.1734 Hough, B., Ministerial responses to parliamentary questions some recent concerns, (2003) Sum Public Law 211 at p.21135 Alder op. cit., at p. 30636 Barnett, op. cit., at p. 38737 Barnett, op. cit., at p. 499 38 Bradley, A.W., Ewing, K.D., Constitutional and Administrative Law, (2007), p. 21739 Standing Orders of the House of Commons, (2009), at p. 15040 Ibid at p. 15641 Barnett, op.ci t., at p. 39342 Cabinet Office, Departmental Evidence and repartee to Select Committees, (2005) at para. 70 43 Alder op. cit., at p. 31044 Griffin, J.A.G., The Common Law and the Political Constitution (2001) 117 Law Quarterly